As I write this (on June 12), the latest polls show the voters swinging backwards and forwards on Brexit. The BBC quotes a poll from June 10 that puts Brexiteers at 55%. Other polls disagree but right now it looks like Leave.
If anyone wants to
know why so many Brits are itching to get out of the EU, they needn’t bother looking
at the spurious tripe and specious data shoved out by the Remain and Leave
campaigns. No-one believes any of it. The real reason Brexit has so much
support can be gleaned from a statement made by actress Emma Thompson at the
Berlin Film Festival back in February.
She was quoted in The Guardian
as saying that Britain was “a tiny little cloud-bolted, rainy corner of sort-of
Europe, a cake-filled misery-laden grey old island”, that she “just felt
European”. These are the elite attitudes that are driving British, and
especially English, votes into the Brexit camp, and reading that was nearly
enough to make me vote “Leave” as well. Many voters wish the liberal middle class
would just take themselves off to Tuscany, then, if that’s where they’d rather
be. It’s part of the same “culture wars” that are leading voters towards Trump
in the US.
Harold Wilson, instigator of the 1975 referendum (Vivienne) |
But this is dangerous. As Owen Jones said in a typically intelligent
piece, also in The Guardian, on June
10: “When presented with a vote on the status quo, it is no surprise that those
with the least stake in it vote to abandon it... Threats of economic Armageddon
resonate little with people living in communities that feel ignored,
marginalised and belittled.” The Leave
campaign, says Jones, is much the same as Trump’s, “powerful vested interests
...masquerading as the praetorian guard of an anti-establishment insurgency.”
He is so right. If some of the polls are to be believed, on June 23 millions of
Brits will traipse into polling booths to vote against their own interests. In
voting against their perceived enemies in the ‘liberal’ elite, people will be voting
for their real enemies. And reading
statements like Emma Thompson’s one understands, with horrible clarity, how
this has happened.
I voted to stay in Europe in 1975. Later I regretted it. For
years I wanted a chance to vote the other way. But I shan’t. I am voting to
stay in the EU, and I think my fellow-Brits should too. Some will have to
swallow some bile to do so. This post explains why I think they should.
Let’s start with the last referendum, 42 years ago.
Another country
The past is another country and in 1975, Britain certainly
was. I worked in a bookshop and when I prepared an invoice, I did it on an
ancient Remington manual typewriter, keeping carbons for the file. When I sold
a book, I handwrote the amount on a paper till roll; the till itself was made
of wood and the tray slid out with a pleasant kerching. Much of the country’s heat and light was still from coal
– even the trains had run on it less than 10 years before, and the stations were
blackened by smoke. A long coal strike
in early 1974, combined with the 1973 oil crisis, had damaged the economy
badly. Inflation was, by modern standards, very high, and in June, the month of
the referendum, it went over 26%. I
remember that in early 1975 my wages were raised from £845 a year to £1,495, to
reflect this. It was not unusual.
Yet if the country was different, the politics of the
referendum were oddly similar. Labour had returned to power in February 1974 in
the wake of the miners’ strike, and had pledged to renegotiate the terms under
which Britain had entered the European Economic Community the year before. This
was popular, as the previous Tory government had broken a 1970 promise to hold
a referendum before entry. Labour’s renegotiation did not, as I recall, change
the terms that much, but Prime Minister Harold Wilson advocated a Yes (remain)
vote; at the same time, however, he allowed members of his government to
campaign on either side, to prevent a disastrous split in his party. Does this
sound familiar?
But the quality of the debate was much higher. There are no
giants like Barbara Castle and Denis Healey around today. And some of the
issues, too, were different. Many Leave voters were incensed by the way we
seemed to have turned our back on the Commonwealth by joining Europe; we had,
they said, kicked our allies in teeth for the sake of our enemies. The war in
Europe had ended barely 30 years earlier; it was not yet really history, and
feelings still ran high. There was also a huge economic risk in the reduction
of tariff barriers with Europe. Britain was still a major industrial power, but
was slipping badly; its goods were declining in quality. French and German
cars, for example, were better assembled – British ones could be maddeningly
unreliable. Some wondered if British industry would survive the competition. It
was a pertinent point; over the course of 1975, unemployment rose from 3.3% to
5.1%.
I was aware of this and especially of the Commonwealth
dimension, and I seem to remember I thought quite hard, or as hard as I ever
did back then (I was 18). But in the end I voted to stay in the EEC, at least
partly because I felt that most European countries were more modern and democratic,
and would be a good influence on us.
A grandiose dream?
It was a long time before I changed my mind. I can remember
being angered when all our petrol pumps had to be converted to litres. British
people didn’t use these to measure fuel consumption, and still don’t, so this was
pointless (though it would likely not happen now). Then I started to feel very uneasy after
Maastricht, which seemed to presage a European state. Such a superstate would
have been an artificial creation that would eventually have cracked apart,
almost certainly with violence. It was a grandiose and vainglorious notion dreamed
up by a rootless elite who felt more
comfortable with each other than with their own people.
The Berlaymont - grandiose? (Anderson Pecorone) |
And yet the driving dream behind the EU – peace and
stability in Europe, after centuries of war – was always a noble one; something
that many in the UK never really understood. To many Brits, Maastricht was as
much an attempt to destroy us as 1940 had been.
Many have seen the EU as little more than a French plot against Britain.
I never approved of “ever-closer union”. But I never saw it as the evil plot
that many of my parents’ generation did. So I felt torn about Europe.
What fixed my opinions was two and a half years in Brussels.
I went there as a long-term consultant on an EU-funded programme for technical
assistance to the former Soviet Union. This programme did some good things but pushed
an economic model that most Russians probably did not want. I also did not feel
comfortable in Brussels. The city itself is pleasant enough, and Belgium in
general deserves a better press. Yet I always sensed an attitude to foreigners;
it was not quite hostility, more a quiet non-acceptance. Also, it rained a lot. And the EU
establishment depressed me – the bureaucrats detached from civil and diplomatic
services who saw Brussels as a step up, or in some cases as a refuge; the ‘stagiaires’, or interns, screaming
acronyms at each other in noisy pubs; the huge self-important buildings,
especially the Berlaymont, then wrapped in sheeting for asbestos removal –
grandiosity again; and the endless paperwork before anything got done. Then in 2001 I got a chance to move to Rome,
as a consultant to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. I jumped at it,
and will never forget emerging into the bright Roman sunshine and giving
thanks. For the next decade I remained a firm Brexiteer.
I’m not any more. For one thing, Cameron’s renegotiation
exempted the UK from “ever-closer union” – but this was not, in truth, a big
concession; the European super-state has been dead in the water for some time.
No-one ever really wanted it, and the Euro crises of recent years, culminating
in the bitter humiliation of Greece, have killed it off for good. But there are
several other reasons for my re-think.
Movement of people
The first reason why I’ve changed my mind is the enormous
exchange of population between Britain and the rest of the EU. It can’t be
reversed. According to the Office for National Statistics, there are nearly
800,000 people of Polish descent in Britain now (not all because of the EU; in
the early 1950s there were already some 150,000, most of whom had arrived
during or after the war). There are also
hundreds of thousands of French nationals in England – the French think it is up to 400,000, mostly
in London. According to the 2011 Census,
there were about 2.68 million people in Britain who had been born elsewhere in
the EU. Meanwhile about 1.3 million UK nationals live elsewhere in the EU –
about half in Spain, to which many retire.
Even if free movement is abrogated completely, it is
inconceivable that all these people could or should be repatriated; it would
involve forced mass migrations last seen in Europe in 1945-46 (and those were
not something one would wish to repeat). Moreover our economy would collapse.
So the immigration argument for Brexit holds little water; yes, we have had a
huge net inward migration from the EU, but those people aren’t going anywhere. They
will have to be given residence permits. It is not even clear that the UK could
prevent further free movement, as it might be a condition of continued access
to the EU single market. Attempting to restrict
it could also threaten the Irish peace process, a threat that Ireland does not
deserve – and a reminder that this referendum isn’t just about us.
There is one immigration-related argument with which I have
some sympathy. People are understandably unimpressed that Romanians and Bulgars
with no links to Britain can move there, whereas an architect in Brisbane or a
database designer in Hyderabad cannot, even if they have family in Britain. But
Brexit would not change this. First, Australia and India do not permit free
movement of UK citizens, and it’s unlikely the UK would make a non-reciprocal
deal. Second, as stated above, to keep access to EU markets we’ll need to accept
free movement to some extent. In that context, no UK government is likely to
permit freer entry of Commonwealth citizens as
well. In any case, the right-wingers who will be in charge after Brexit are
unlikely to be sympathetic to any
non-white immigration. More family members from the subcontinent? Forget it.
So much for immigration. It is something many British people
care about deeply, having seen their communities, their high streets and their
workplaces change with lightning speed, and without their consent. But Brexit
will do little to change any of this.
European security
Meanwhile, a grave argument against Brexit is security and
stability. The Leave camp insists that this is a matter for NATO, not the EU,
and that it is therefore irrelevant. It is not.
First, NATO has historically been driven by the US, and today
it is at least as interested in Asia. As I write this, the State Department’s
attention is probably more on the Spratly Islands than Ukraine. A British exit
will send a dangerous message to Moscow.
Franco with his Prime Minister shortly before his death in 1975 |
This will be even more dangerous if Britain’s departure
leads to an unravelling of the EU in general, as some (including, it is said,
Angela Merkel) believe it might. Besides exposing Europe to external threats,
it could reverse the peace within Europe that it has enjoyed for most of my
lifetime. Not because France and Germany would be at each other’s throats (they
wouldn’t), but because the EU has been the driver for a wholesale growth in
democracy in Europe. It is easy to forget that in 1975, Spain was still under
the dictatorship of General Franco – he was to die that November – and Greece
and Portugal had thrown off authoritarian regimes only the previous year. The prospect of EU membership was an incentive
for these countries to adopt democratic regimes and they have retained them.
Even more important, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact regimes in 1989-91 left a
vacuum that could easily have been filled by the type of semi-fascist
governments that dominated the region before 1939. Again, the prospect of EU
membership came, for many in the east, to symbolise the drive for modernity and
an escape from the past.
Do we wish to reverse that? The far right has reappeared in
Europe and the EU is a bulwark against it. Again, it is a reminder of something
that many in Britain either forget, or willfully ignore: This referendum is not
just about us.
A democratic deficit?
We also need to stop believing that leaving the EU will be some
sort of liberation from an oppressive bureaucracy. Let’s start with the
supposed democratic deficit in Brussels.
The Fall of the Wall: An EU peace in Eastern Europe? (Lear 21) |
To be sure, the European Commission is not properly elected and
sometimes seems unaccountable. But in theory, at least, its members must be
approved by the European Parliament. Moreover, while the Parliament can’t
dismiss individual Commissioners once they’re in office, it can dismiss the Commission as a whole. So
when one Commissioner, Édith Cresson, refused to resign in January 1999
following a corruption scandal, the Parliament threatened to throw out the entire
Commission (which resigned en masse before
that could happen).
The European Parliament is properly elected under a
proportional system. The Westminster Parliament is not. The current UK government
has the votes of only 24% of the electorate – and only about 37% of the votes
actually cast. “Out” voters may want to ponder the fact that UKIP got one
Westminster seat for its 3.9 million votes, while the Tories got a seat for
every 44,000 votes and Labour one seat per 34,000 votes. Worse, the government drawn
from this “elected” parliament has complete authority; as long as it retains a
majority, it will not be dismissed, and is virtually unaccountable. Moreover it
can do pretty much what it likes; there is an unelected Lords that can delay
but not prevent its legislation, and a Head of State who by convention does
neither. Britain is, in fact, marginal for being called a democracy, and anyone
wishing to address the “democratic deficit” had best start at home.
An independent, influential
UK?
The last serious argument against Brexit, for me, is the global dimension.The Brexit camp would have you believe that, out of Europe,
Britain could pick up its pre-EU threads and continue to influence world events
at the top table. This is deluded.
First, the EU as a bloc is a bigger and more important
entity than the UK. Assuming it survives Brexit, the great powers will talk to
it or to its prime mover, Germany – not to us. Ah, the Leave campaign will say,
but we’re still the world’s fifth largest economy, a nuclear power and a member
of the UN Security Council. They’ll talk to us as well.
Let’s examine this.
One of the first things that will happen if Britain votes “Leave”
is that the Scottish Nationalists will attempt to hold a new independence
referendum. This won’t automatically happen, as the SNP lost its majority in
the Scottish Parliament in May 2016. However, it is only two seats short, and
if any one of the other parties were to support it in this matter, it could
prevail. Even if they did not do so, it is not hard to imagine one or two
renegades from the other parties supporting the motion. The 2014 vote against
independence, though clear, was not a landslide. A Leave vote in the UK as a
whole would probably make many Scots think again – especially if, as seems
likely, Scotland votes Remain.
There would be two consequences. First, the UK would be
diminished. Only about 10% of the population would be lost, but the permanence
of the UK as an entity would be cast into doubt. Second, the UK nuclear
deterrent would have to leave its current base at Faslane. This would raise the
cost of renewing Trident, already put at about £100 billion (though this is a
lifetime cost; the initial outlay would be smaller). Given the economic
uncertainty that would follow Brexit, the government of the truncated UK would
have to think hard about this – and about the political cost of imposing a
nuclear submarine base on some new location, possibly Plymouth.
A smaller country, without a nuclear deterrent. The case for
retaining our permanent seat on the UN Security Council, already shaky, might now
be untenable – especially as other member states could argue that the UK was no
longer the country to which the seat was allocated in 1945 (a thin argument, but
it will be used). Out of Europe. Off the Security Council. No longer of
significance in Washington. Let us hope Argentina does not then invade the
Falklands, for there will be few to support us if they do.
What are we left with, after Brexit? At home, we will have an inbuilt Conservative majority at
Westminster. It isn’t hard to see why right-wing interests are so keen on
Brexit. Boris Johnson or (more likely) Michael Gove would become Prime
Minister, and the loss of the Scottish electorate and the rigged electoral
system will keep him there. Social welfare will come to an end and the NHS will
be put out to tender.
Millions of ordinary English voters, affronted by remarks
such as Emma Thompson’s, will march into the booths on the 23rd and mark the
cross for Leave, thinking they are voting against the likes of her. But they won’t
be. They will be voting for their real
enemies. Meanwhile, a rump country, diminished in the world, will watch its
remaining influence slip away and realize, too late, that the Leave vote has
brought the long post-imperial twilight to an end.
This piece is also on the VoxEurop site, here.
Follow Mike Robbins on Twitter (mikerobbins19), on Facebook or on Goodreads
Mike Robbins's essay Such Little Accident: British democracy and its enemies
was published in December 2016 and is available from Amazon and other online retailers, or through bookshops
(ISBN 978-0-9978815-0-9, ebook; ISBN 978-0-9978815-1-6, paperback)
Excellent piece Mike. Right to the point showing exactly which group would most benefit by Brexit and the kind of hegemony as the aftermath.
ReplyDeleteGood to read Mike and confirms my thinking why I wanted to vote remain. Thanks for this.
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